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The conduct constituting genocide is repugnant, reprehensible in the
highest degree, and, obviously, needs to be prevented or punished.
Proceeding from that premise, we may now ask whether the specification of
genocide as a separate crime - a crime distinct from other crimes against
humanity - is good law or good policy. My conclusion is that it is neither
good law nor good policy - that, in fact, more is lost than is gained by
emphasizing the distinction between genocide and crimes against humanity
of other types.
I come to this conclusion for two reasons. First, there is simply a lack
of compelling moral or normative reasons to set genocide apart from other
crimes against humanity. And second, there are substantial costs entailed in
maintaining that legal distinction. After first situating genocide as a type of
crime against humanity, I will then lay out the theoretical and practical
reasons that cause me to conclude that it is not desirable to place genocide
in a class by itself.
Genocide is defined in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide Convention") as:
Any of the following acts, when committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
or, forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
That definition has been incorporated into the statutes of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
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signature Dec. 9, 1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
2 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, in Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808, Annex, art. 4(2), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter
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and, most recently, into the statute of the International Criminal Court
("ICC").3
The term "genocide" was coined by Raphael Lemkin in his 1944 book
"Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.' 4 Lemkin intended the term to capture the
character of the crimes of the Holocaust. While the prosecutor before the
Nuremberg tribunal did use the term "genocide" in proceedings before the
court5 and in the indictment of October 8, 1945, the charters of the
International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo did not contain
the world "genocide"', and the judgments of the two tribunals contained no
reference to the term.8 For conduct that comprised the elements now
considered to constitute genocide, defendants at the post-war international
tribunals were convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity. It was
after those post-war prosecutions that the Genocide Convention was
negotiated, under UN auspices, during 1947-48, entering into force in 1951.
Looking at the relevant conventions and statutes, from the Genocide
Convention through the ICC Statute, we can see that genocide is a type or
subcategory of crime against humanity. Crimes against humanity are
defined as a set of acts, similar to - though somewhat broader than - the
acts listed in the definition of genocide, when those acts are "committed as
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
other Such Violations Committed in the territory of Neighboring States, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 4353d mtg., Annex, at art.(2)(2), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art.6, U.N. Doc.
A/CoNF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
4 See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAW OF OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS
OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (1944).
5 See, e.g., NUREMBERG TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH DAY,
July 29, 1946, reprinted in THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, VOL. 19,
NUREMBERG TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/vl9menu.htm
(last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
6 Indictment, International Military Tribunal v. Hermann W. Goering. Count 3, Sec. VIII,
para. (a), reprinted in THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, VOL. 1, NUREMBERG
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/count3.htm
(last visited Feb. 13,2004).
7 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, annex, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan.
19, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (amended Apr. 26, 1946, 4 Bevans 27).
8 See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Sept. 30, 1946, reprinted in
RICHARD A. FALK, CRIMES OF WAR 96 (1971); Judgment of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, reprinted in THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, 26 APRIL 1946 - 12 NOVEMBER 1948 (B.V.A. Roling
& C.F. Riter eds. 1977).
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part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack." 9 Genocide thus is a form of
-crime against humanity: A crime against humanity constitutes genocide
when the specified act is committed with intent to destroy a national,
ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.'0
That said, we may now consider what is to be gained and to be lost in
distinguishing genocide as an offense separate from other crimes against
humanity. I will argue that drawing that distinction is, on balance, neither
warranted nor desirable.
The essential feature distinguishing genocide from other crimes
against humanity is the element of intent to destroy a group defined by one
or more of the four specified criteria: race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion.
It is not self-evident, from a moral or normative standpoint, that an atrocity
committed with the intent to destroy a group defined by race, ethnicity,
nationality or religion is per se more grave than an atrocity committed with
intent to destroy a group defined by other characteristics, or even an
atrocity committed against a random group of individuals.
Controversy has, for decades, surrounded the question whether the
four criteria of race, ethnicity, nationality, and religion, should constitute
9 See, e.g., ICTR Statute, supra note 2, at art. 3; ICC Statute, supra note 3, at art. 7. The
ICC Statute defines crimes against humanity as:
[A]ny of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or
forcible transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation
of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f)
Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible
under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced
disappearance of persons; () The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts
of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body or to mental or physical health. Id.
10 The character of genocide as a type of crime against humanity is reflected particularly
clearly in the ICC Elements of Crimes. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court Addendum: Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes,
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (2000) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes]. The
ICC elements of genocide require proof that "[t]he conduct took place in the context of a
manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could
itself effect such destruction." Id. at art. 6(a)(4), 6(b)(4), 6(c)(5), 6(d)(5), 6(e)(7) (emphasis
added). That element, which is roughly analogous to the element in the definition of crimes
against humanity requiring that the conduct was part of a "widespread or systematic attack,"
further highlights the character of genocide as a type of crime against humanity.
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the exhaustive list in the definition of genocide. In the negotiation of the
Genocide Convention in 1947-48, the controversy centered primarily on
whether political groups should be added to the list."1 Those opposed to the
inclusion of political groups, led by the Soviet Union, made a number of
arguments. First, they argued, political groups should be excluded because,
since political association is voluntary and not immutable, political groups
are inherently impermanent and unstable. 12  Second, they argued, the
inclusion of political groups in the coverage of the Genocide Convention
would discourage states from participating in the Convention for fear of
interference by international authorities in the internal political affairs of
sovereign states.1 3 Third, a slippery-slope argument was made to the effect
that, if political groups were included, then the inclusion of economic,
professional, and other groups would likely soon follow.' 4  Ultimately,
political groups were excluded from the definition of genocide in the
Genocide Convention.
National law, developed during the same era, varied on this point. The
penal code of Ethiopia, for example, explicitly includes political groups
within the definition of genocide.' Romanian genocide law incorporates
the broadest definition, referring simply to the destruction of "social
groups.' 6
Not only is there continuing disagreement on this issue reflected at the
level of national law, but the exclusion of political groups has also
continued to be a source of contention internationally. In the negotiation of
the ICC Statute - including even the negotiations at the final diplomatic
conference at which the ICC Statute was adopted - attempts continued to
include political groups within the definition of genocide in the ICC
Statute.
In addition to the controversy concerning the inclusion of political
groups within the definition of genocide, there has also been sustained
controversy over the inclusion of other social categories. In the early
period of the ICC negotiations, recommendations were made to include
11 See WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 63
(2000).
2 1d. at 134-137.
13 Id. at 137.
14Id. at 113, 136.
15 Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1957 art. 281 (Eth.). Ethiopian law does not
distinguish between genocide and crimes against humanity, but rather lists the two as a
single offense ("Genocide; Crimes Against Humanity") within a single article of the penal
code. See id.
16 See Romanian Socialist Republic Penal Code art. 356 (Rom.), available at
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/romania.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
17 See generally Phillipe Kirsch & John Holmes, The Rome Conference of the
International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 2 (1999).
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other social groups such as groups based on gender or sexual orientation.
18
All of these suggestions ultimately were rejected; the final version of the
ICC Statute incorporates the same "list of four" as was adopted in the
Genocide Convention and later reiterated in the statutes of the ad hoc
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Political and other social
groups are thus excluded from the international definitions of genocide.
Perhaps that was the right outcome. Certainly, some commentators are
of the view that the destruction of a racial, ethnic, national, or religious
group is graver than the destruction of other social groups (that is, graver
than the destruction of social groups defined by other criteria).' 9 But that
intuition eludes me. I understand the point, but am left unmoved by the
contention that the four categories identified are the most significant social
groups. In fact, it strikes me that positioning race, ethnicity, nationality and
religion above - and as more fundamental than - other social categories
fosters a world view that places special saliency on precisely those
categories. In that way, singling out race, ethnicity, nationality, and
religion as the categories of most special significance might even tend to
foster the very sort of thinking that is at the heart of the genocidal project.
Whatever our intuitions concerning the normative significance of
particular social categories, there is an additional, practical difficulty that
emerges from distinguishing genocide from other crimes against humanity.
The distinction of genocide from other crimes against humanity tends to
distract attention from the essential wrongdoing. Instead of focusing on the
central problem - the systematic annihilation of civilian populations -
attention becomes diverted to subsidiary issues concerning the content and
application of the criteria distinguishing genocide from crimes against
humanity. The distinction of genocide from other crimes against humanity
leads, for example, to discussion of whether religious convictions are more
immutable than political beliefs (in order to explain why destruction of
religious groups but not political groups should come within the definition
of genocide); or attention is focused on whether attacks based on social
class are or are not as reprehensible as attacks based on nationality (and
whether, therefore, the slaughter of Kulaks was not genocide while the
slaughter of the Armenians was); and so on. The criteria distinguishing
genocide from crimes against humanity also raise ambiguities in the
characterization of perpetrators' motives. There was, for example,
discussion of whether the slaughter of Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 could be
characterized as the targeting of a political rather than ethnic group, and, if
18 See Rhonda Copelon, International Conference: Gender Crimes as War Crimes:
Integrating Crimes Against Women into International Criminal Law, 46 McGILL L.J. 217,
235-238 (2000).
19 See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 11, at 113-114, 150.
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so, whether perpetrators could thereby evade the characterization of their
conduct as genocide.2°
Along similar lines, I recall a rather bizarre discussion in Serbia in
2001. It was at a training session for Serbian judges, prosecutors, and
defense counsel preparing for possible war-crimes trials at the national level
in Serbia. The conversation lapsed into an almost surreal tangent about
whether various horrific fact patterns would or would not constitute
genocide - depending upon whether the targeted group was properly
conceived of as an ethnicity; or depending upon whether the slaughter of
some subset of the group (for instance, only the males) should count.2  I
was left quite certain that we were losing sight of the essentials because of
the allure of a genocide conviction as compared with a "mere" conviction
for crimes against humanity.
In addition to creating a distraction from the central problem, the
identification of genocide as a distinct offense also leads to an unfortunate
sort of competition for the use of the term. Genocide is frequently
identified as the most serious of all international crimes. It is not
infrequently referred to as "the crime of crimes. 22 Because of this special
and elevated status, there is a tendency, among advocates of various causes,
to apply the label of "genocide" to an ever-broadening range of conduct in
order to claim the rhetorical advantages that the term has to offer.2 3
Perhaps partly in reaction to the tendency to use the term "genocide"
promiscuously - as well as for other reasons - there are countervailing
efforts, made by other groups, to claim that a very small set of events have
actually constituted genocide, with the most extreme claim being that there
has been only one true genocide, that being the Holocaust.24 Again, this
does not seem like a fruitful focus of the limited energies available for the
prevention or punishment of the atrocities in question.
If there were something important to be gained by the distinction
between genocide and other crimes against humanity, then we might be
willing to countenance the associated drawbacks and pitfalls, both
theoretical and practical. But it is not clear what the payoff of the
20 See, e.g., Final Report of the Commission of Experts on Rwanda, at 158, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1405 (1994).
21 See author's notes from Specialized Training Seminar in International Humanitarian
Law, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, convened by the Humanitarian Law Center, Belgrade and the
International Bar Association, August 2001.
22 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, Trial Chamber, I.C.T.R.,
No. ICTR-97-23-S, 16(1998); See generally Schabas, supra note 11.
23 See Schabas, supra note 11, at 102-105 (arguing political groups by their nature would
benefit from being a protected group).
24 See, e.g., Steven T. Katz, The Uniqueness of the Holocaust: The Historical Dimension,
in Is THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE: PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE 19 (Alan S.
Rosenbaum ed., 1996).
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distinction really is. The category of "crimes against humanity" is
sufficiently grave and condemnatory to serve the relevant purposes. It
captures the appropriate meaning and opprobrium. To attempt to subdivide
the category of crimes against humanity into a rank-ordered hierarchy of
horrors only distracts from the magnitude of the atrocities in question and
tends to diminish the gravity of crimes against humanity.
In my view, it would have been better if genocide had not emerged as
a separate offense from crimes against humanity. But it has; that is a
historical fact. At this stage, it would be politically impossible for a
prosecutor prosecuting conduct with the elements of genocide to prosecute
it not as genocide but "merely" as crimes against humanity. I consider that
unfortunate. That being the case, I would want to cabin rather than to
expand the "genocide" category - and would want to rely as much as
possible on the charge of crimes against humanity - and to augment its
impact and bite.
There is every reason to publicize and to act against crimes of this
character - crimes against humanity of all types - and to attempt to
mobilize governments and other actors to prevent and to punish the
conduct. That should be the focus and the goal.
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